National Innovation System and Disruptive Innovations in Synthetic Rubber and Tire Technology by Gehani, Ray R.




Received June 6, 2007 / Accepted October 14, 2007 
 
 
NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM AND DISRUPTIVE INNOVATIONS IN 
SYNTHETIC RUBBER AND TIRE TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
R. RAY GEHANI, D. Eng., Ph.D. 
Director, Technology Management and Innovation Programs 
The University of Akron, College of Business Administration #358 





 The current models of National Innovation Systems (NIS) are based on interactions and learning across three 
institutions: government, university and industry.  This empirical study of the evolution of innovations in rubber and tire 
technologies such as the collaborative innovative suppliers (of raw materials and human capital) and disruptive rival 
innovators to the traditional tri-helical model of National Innovation System.  This was empirically examined for the 
evolution of rubber and tire technology and the rise and decline of its innovative region: the Rubber Capital of the World in 
Akron, Ohio. 
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Schumpeter (1950) described “creative 
destruction,” as creating new value with a higher consumer 
welfare that destroys the economic returns for producing 
the older or prevailing products.  The resource-based view 
of strategy underscores the strategic significance of 
innovative capabilities of an enterprise (Grant, 1991; 
Gehani, 1998).  The evolutionary economic approach 
proposed by Nelson (1996) combined the firm’s 
formulation of innovation strategy with a higher level 
aggregation of resources and capabilities to examine the 
dynamic changes driven by technological innovations.  This 
was a distinct new approach from the mainstream 
equilibrium approach based in the Industrial Organization 
(IO) economics (Porter, 1991). 
  
 
The tri-helical National Innovation System (NIS) 
emphasizes the dynamic interactions and learning across 
government, university, and industry - the key institutions 
driving risky innovations (Freeman, 1987; Nelson, 1993; 
Ohmae, 1995).  The National Innovation System, however, 
does not protect enterprises from attacks from emerging 
disruptive innovators (Christensen, 1997). 
Bower and Christensen (1995) and Foster (1986) 
noted that as markets shift, the industry leaders, with large 
investments sunk in their existing technologies, tend to 
become complacent and fail to recognize the emerging 
disruptive innovations by new challengers.  The incumbent 
leaders resist making large investments in new 
technological innovations to reach out to the emerging new 
customers because these innovations demand developing a 
portfolio of new value-adding capabilities that are different 
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from those needed for the incumbent technological 
innovations and the existing customers (Gehani, 1998).   
This phenomenon, vividly illustrated by the 
evolution of innovations in rubber and tire industry, 
supports that the current tri-helical model of the National 
Innovation System is inadequate, and deserves careful re-
examination and redefinition.   
 This study examined the relationship between the 
National Innovation System and the emergence and 
evolution of innovations in synthetic rubber and tire 
technology.  This relationship was established by reviewing 
how different national innovation policies in different 
countries were linked to the evolution of synthetic rubber 
technology from its birth in early twentieth century to the 
oil crises in the 1970s.   
This empirical study helped develop an extended 
model for the National Innovation System.  The impact of 
innovation policies by national government on an 
innovative enterprise was examined alongside other 
important innovative actors, such as (1) the regional 
innovation institutions including regional research 
laboratories, (2) the research universities, (3) the 
collaborative innovation suppliers (of raw materials or 
human capital), and (4) the competing innovative 
enterprises.   
The underlying hypothesis of this empirical study 
was that whereas the macro government-level policies and 
regional innovation institutions facilitate the development 
of a radically innovative technology, but when considering 
the sustainability of competitiveness of an innovative 
technology, it is also important to take into account the role 
and interactions of the collaborative innovation suppliers 
and the disruptive innovative rivals.  For example, in the 
case of the evolution of innovations in synthetic rubber and 
tire technology, a key role was played in the 1870s by the 
regional Board of Trade in the emergence of major rubber 
enterprises such as Goodrich and Goodyear (Love and 
Giffels, 1999).  This led to the emergence of Akron region 
in Ohio as the Rubber Capital of the World.  At other times, 
significant roles were played by the local workers’ unions 
and disruptive radial tire technology from rival Michelin in 
the demise of rubber tire industry in Akron in the 1970s.  
These effects are not easily explained by the prevailing 





COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF ENTERPRISES AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION STRATEGY 
  
The resource-based view of strategy underscores the 
significance of capabilities and resources of an enterprise in 
formulating its business and corporate strategies deployed 
to gain sustainable competitive advantage (Grant, 1991; 
Gehani, 1998).  This view is different from the 
environmental determinism for firms in an industry that 
was presented by Harvard Professor Michael Porter in his 
five force competitive analysis (Porter, 1991).  According 
to this theory, the potential profitability (and 
innovativeness) of an enterprise depends on the power of 
the five structural forces in its industry.  The evolutionary 
economic approach proposed by Nelson (1996) and others 
combined the firm-level approach to formulation of strategy 
with a higher level aggregation of resources and 
capabilities.  This approach examines the dynamic changes 
driven by technological innovations, and distances itself 
from the mainstream equilibrium approach in the Industrial 
Organization (IO) economics. 
 Schumpeter in The Theory of Economic 
Development, and Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 
proposed that innovation is the activity for developing an 
invented entity into a commercially useful entity that 
becomes socially accepted.  In Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy, Schumpeter also proposed that innovations, in 
the form of new products, new production processes, new 
modes of transportation, and new forms of industrial 
organization, drive the competitive advantage of an 
enterprise competing under capitalism.  Innovations disrupt 
and “revolutionize… the economic market structure from 
within, …destroying the old one (and) …creating a new 
one” (Schumpeter, 1950). This was described as “creative 
destruction,” creating new value with higher consumer 
welfare, and destroying the economic returns for producing 
the old products (Schumpeter, 1950)..   
At first, Schumpeter’s innovation included “mega” 
developments, such as the introduction of railroad 
transportation technology in a new society.  Later in 1950s, 
he included micro developments in innovations such as new 
products and services -  motorcars, electric appliances, and 
railroad services, as well as new methods of production – 
the mechanized factory, the electrified factory, chemical 
synthesis and the like (Schumpeter, 1950). 
 Freeman and Soet (1977) endorsed Schumpeter 
(1950) by defining the scope of innovation to include 
invention with product and process commercialization.  
Many years later, Drucker (1985) highlighted that the two 
basic functions of a business firm are marketing and 
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NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS, REGIONS, AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
  
Typically, technological innovation drives a nation’s 
technological progress (Drucker, 1985).  However, 
innovations, particularly radical disruptive innovations, 
have excessive risks.  Their potential returns are uncertain 
and unpredictable.  This risk is especially high for R&D 
intensive complex technologies, such as semiconductors, 
polymers (including rubber elastomers), and biogenetic 
pharmaceuticals (Gehani, 1998).  For technological 
innovation in such high-tech areas, government guidance is 
necessary and sometimes essential. 
 The understanding of the drivers of innovation has 
evolved over time in different phases (Gehani, 1998).  The 
earliest understanding of the source of innovation was the 
“science and technology push” approach.  Charles 
Goodyear, Thomas Edison, and Alexander Graham Bell 
first invented their technologies for vulcanization of rubber, 
light bulb, and telephone, respectively.  These innovators 
set out to diffuse these innovations to the reluctant potential 
consumers in the market.   
Schmookler (1966), turned this process 180 
degrees around into “market-pull method,” and suggested 
that the market and not R&D should be the key driver for 
technological innovations.  He noted that innovative 
enterprises identified the gaps in their potential markets for 
any unmet demands, and filled these gaps with their 
technological innovations.   
Both these sequential sources of technological 
innovation were criticized for using simplistic one-
dimensional approaches for a multi-dimensional and highly 
interactive process.  The attention of researchers then 
focused on a firm’s capabilities as the primary source of 
technological innovation (Grant, 1991).  It was noted that 
an innovative firm benefited immensely from its 
interactions with its macro national-level and micro 
industry-level environments (Utterback, 1986).  This gave 
birth to the development and discussion of the National 
Innovation System.   
 National Innovation System (NIS) emphasizes the 
systems approach for the innovation process, actor 
institutions, and the learning across these (Nelson, 1993).  
NIS includes all the inter-related institutional actors 
involved in exploring, generating, diffusing, and exploiting 
technological and organizational innovations (Freeman, 
1987; Nelson, 1993; Ohmae,1995).  Most of these NIS 
researchers emphasized interactions between three major 
actor groups: national government, research universities, 
and innovative enterprises.  Interactive learning between 
knowledge producers and knowledge consumers plays a 
significant role in a National Innovation System.  Figure – 1 
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Figure – 1: Tri-Helical National Innovation System 
More recently, Chung (2002) and Oughton et al. 
(2002) have pointed out that usually the National 
Innovation Systems aggregate and encompass the regional 
innovation systems.  They noted vast differences in the 
innovative capabilities and earning potential of different 
regions.  National Innovation Systems often operate 
through their subsidiary regional institutions.   
This study, proposed that the regional institutions 
sponsoring innovation (such as regional research 
laboratories) play a significant role, and must be 
highlighted separately.  The traditional triple helix model 
for National Innovation System, comprising of government, 
university, and industry, seemed insufficient to explain the 
emergence of a variety of innovations and strategic shifts in 
rubber and tire technology..   
EXTENDED NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM 
 
The proposed Extended National Innovation 
System (ENIS) is shown in Figure-2.  This new model 
expands the traditional National Innovation System 
(Nelson, 1993) by including the  regional actors such as the 
regional/state innovation institution including regional 
research laboratories.  This extended model also 
specifically includes the industry level institutions such as 
the collaborative innovating suppliers.  This extended 
model was developed and validated empirically by 
examining the historical evolution of innovations in rubber 
and tire technology. 
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Figure-2: Extended National Innovation System Model 
 
NATURAL AND SYNTHETIC RUBBER 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
Rubber is a highly elastic material that enhances 
the quality of modern life.  It is a unique material in that it 
stretches many times its length without breaking, and it 
recovers to its original shape.  This, therefore, makes rubber 
an indispensable material for many key applications such as 
automobile tires, conveyor belts, gloves, and many more.  
The top five largest consumers of rubber are the United 
States, Russia, Japan, China and Germany (Barlow et al., 
1994). The world-wide per capita consumption of rubber is 
over 3.0 kilograms, though in Japan it is almost five times 
this amount, Germany uses four times, and the United 
States uses three times as much per capita rubber.  China, a 
top-5 consumer by volume, uses only one third, and India 








NATURAL RUBBER TECHNOLOGY 
 
Traditionally, natural rubber (NR) was harvested 
from the Havea Brasiliensis tree of the Amazon basin in 
Brazil (Onokpise, 2004).  Long slanted cuts are made in the 
trunk of the rubber tree for latex to flow into a cup.  Despite 
the technological innovations for synthetic rubber, natural 
rubber continues to account for 30-40% of the total world 
consumption of all types of rubber (Barlow et al., 1994).  
Rubber grows only in the tropical high rainfall regions 
within 10 degrees of the equator.  Most of the natural 
rubber is produced in small estate plots of 2-3 hectares.  
Rubber planters rely on traders who consolidate their raw 
rubber production, grade it, process it, and ship it to rubber 
goods manufacturers. 
Raw natural rubber is plastic and not elastic.  Raw 
rubber had to be first processed and made elastic by 
innovating the “vulcanization” process in order to innovate 
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VULCANIZATION OF RUBBER 
 
Charles Goodyear spent many years and all his 
family’s resources to innovate the process of making 
physically stable goods out of natural rubber.  According to 
the industrial legend, in January 1839, Charles Goodyear 
accidentally dropped sulfur wrapped in a sheet of raw 
natural India rubber on a hot kitchen stove at his New 
Haven, Connecticut home (Gehani, 1998).  His years of 
research had prepared his mind to instantly recognize that at 
the fringes the charred rubber was stabilized.  In the past, 
natural rubber had just melted with heat.  Goodyear did a 
few more experiments to perfect the vulcanization process 
so that rubber could be processed into rubber goods with 
stable physical properties. Unfortunately, Goodyear never 
saw the financial fruits of his technological innovations, 
and he died penniless in 1860. 
 Technological innovations have played key roles 
throughout the history of the worldwide rubber industry 
(Barlow et. al, 1994).  The yield of natural rubber plants in 
Amazon was improved over the years.  In 1915, the natural 
rubber plants were introduced in the East Indies (now 
Indonesia).  These plants had 2-3 times more yield.  Roads 
and railways were built into rubber plantations (Thee, 
1979).  Colonists migrated South Asian and Chinese 
workers to these plantations.  These migrant workers had 
high mortality because of poor housing conditions 
(Szekely, 1979).  In the 1920s and 1930s, many effective 
methods of weeding, controlling disease, fertilizing, and 
better trapping were innovated and introduced.  Thicker 
jungles were cleared for plantation of more rubber trees.  
To recover these expenses, the colonists levied high land 
and export taxes on the local natives.  This was a major 
source of their revenue in 1920.  Until the Second World 
War, the East Indies and Malaysia were the major 
producers of natural rubber in the world (See Table-1). 
 
Table - 1  Worldwide Production of Natural Rubber, 1916-47, ‘000 Tons 
___________________________________________________________ 
 Malay       Indo- Thai India Sri Asia   Brazil Latin World 
 -sia       nesia -land  Lanka   Amer. 
___________________________________________________________ 
1916 101  24 - 3 24 152 n/a 46 199  
1917 141  46 - 3 33 224 33 47 279 
1918 114  44 - 4 21 184 23 33 222 
1919 209  89 - 7 46 354 33 45 405 
1920 183  77 - 6 41 310 24 42 357 
 
1921 158  73 - 6 41 310 17 21 303 
1922 213  105 1 6 48 378 17 21 401 
1923 195  139 2 4 38 383 14 20 407 
1924 190  153 3 5 38 395 20 26 426 
1925 228  197 5 6 47 492 23 34 533 
 
1926 296  211 4 6 60 587 22 31 626 
1927 253  236 5 7 57 568 26 38 613 
1928 316  232 5 7 58 629 18 25 661 
1929 482  259 5 8 81 846 18 23 874 
1930 467  245 4 9 77 813 12 16 834 
 
1931 445  261 5 5 63 792 10 12 807 
1932 422  214 3 1 50 705 6 6 713 
1933 470  285 7 1 65 846 n/a 10 858 
1934 518  386 18 6 80 1030 8 10 1043 
1935 404  292 28 8 55 818 10 13 837 
 
1936 394  316 36 9 51 851 13 18 877 
1937 550  441 37 10 71 1156 15 21 1188 
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1938 378  306 43 8 50 848 14 19 879 
1939 415  376 43 10 63 976 4 10 1000 
1940 603  546 45 13 89 1365 19 26 1407 
 
1941 544  660 46 17 102 1470 16 18 1504 
1942 167  203 n/a 16 104 583 27 37 650 
1943 81  102 n/a 16 108 384 30 43 483 
1944 25  51 n/a 17 101 260 30 51 366 
1945 9  10 n/a 17 100 151 24 48 247 
 
1946 419  178 n/a 16 96 765 24 41 850 
1947 694  282 n/a 16 90 1205 26 36 1281 
____________________________________________________________  
Source: Adapted from Barlow, Jayasuriya, and Tan. (1994). Appendix A3. 
 
During the Second World War, the technological 
progress in natural rubber in the south-east Asia came to a 
stand still.  Americans tried to develop alternate guayule 
cultivation, but progress was slow, and the initiative was 
abandoned in 1946 (Barlow et. al, 1994).  The subsequent 
technological development in Havea natural rubber, took 
place in Malaysia in the 1950s, in Thailand in the 1960s, 
and in Indonesia in the 1970s.  In tire applications, the 
natural rubber has low heat build up, high tensile strength, 
and higher resistance to fatigue.  Natural rubber is, 
therefore, particularly suited to applications in heavy-duty 
commercial vehicles.  
 
KEY STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF 
THE EXTENDED NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM 
 
 In this section, the role of old and newly proposed 
structural elements related to an extended national 
innovation system will be empirically examined and 
integrated. 
 
1. NATIONAL INNOVATION POLICIES 
FOR SYNTEHETIC RUBBER INNOVATION 
 
Synthetic rubber is produced by polymerizing 
monomers made from petroleum oil or natural gas.  High 
natural rubber prices in the early 1900s motivated intensive 
research for innovating the process for making synthetic 
rubbers.   
In most countries national government policies 
have guided the innovation, development, and production 
of natural and synthetic rubber in many significant ways.  
During the 1930s, the growth of natural rubber was stifled 
by rival foreign government restrictions and tariffs (Barlow 
et. al, 1994).  Early innovation of synthetic rubber 
technology was subsidized by governments.  Yield and 
plantation of natural rubber was also supported by 
governments in the 1960s. 
 
German National Innovation Policy 
 
In 1910, a commercial production process for 
synthetic rubber was innovated in Germany after it was 
discovered that sodium helped accelerate its 
polymerization.  In the First World War of Europe from 
1914 to 1918, Germany was cut off from the natural rubber 
supply chain by British enemy blockade.  Prices and 
demand of natural rubber rose.  This drove the innovation, 
development, and production of small quantities of 
synthetic rubber.  German government heavily subsidized 
the development and production of the polybutadiene 2,3-
dimethyl butadiene or methyl rubber (Barlow et. al, 1994).  
It took 2-3 months to process it, and the finished goods 
made from methyl rubber were inferior to those made from 
natural rubber.   
By the end of the First World War, Friedrich 
Bayer & Co. produced more than 2,300 tonnes of methyl 
rubber, costing $2.80-3.20 per kg (Naunton, 1952).  The 
tires made from methyl rubber had some serious 
weaknesses.  The methyl rubber tires flattened due to creep, 
and had to be lifted to avoid the same.  But, it was the first 
technological breakthrough for a synthetic rubber 
innovation.   
After the First World War, the sodium process for 
methyl rubber was replaced with emulsion polymerization 
of gaseous butadiene monomer, with peroxide as catalyst 
(Barlow et al., 1994).  This process innovation had many 
advantages.  The reaction speed was faster and this process 
produced more homogenous product. 
  In the mid-1920s, Bayer and Co. started 
collaborating with IG Farben, partly owned by German 
government.  The German four-year Self-Sufficiency Plan 
of 1933, imposed heavy tariff duties and tight quotas on 
imports of natural rubber, and encouraged innovation of 
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Buna S (SBR), Buna R (NBR), and other synthetic rubbers 
such as Numbered Bunas (Barlow et. al, 1994).  By 1937, 
approximately 2,000 tonnes of Buna-S were produced for 
general-purpose applications (See Table – 2).  This 
increased to 37,100 long tonnes by 1940 (Barlow et. al, 
1994).  Their unit cost, however, was much higher than the 
international rubber prices.   
 
 
Table - 2 Worldwide Production of Synthetic Rubber, 1933-1956, ‘000 tons 
______________________________________________________________  
 Germany    USSR  East  USA Canada Worldwide  
     Germany 
______________________________________________________________  
1933 --  2  --  -- --  2 
  
1934 --  11  --  -- --  11 
 
1935 --  26  --  -- --  26 
1936 --  44  --  -- --  44 
1937 3  25  --  1 --  29 
1938 5  54  --  1 --  60 
1939 22  80  --  2 --  104 
 
1940 40  80  --  3 --  123 
1941 70  71  --  8 --  150 
1942 99  n/a  --  22 --  121 
1943 118  n/a  --  235 3  356 
1944 103  n/a  --  776 36  915 
 
1945 -  n/a  --  833 47  880 
1946 16  125  24  852 52  970 
1947 8  155  25  516 43  747 
1948 3  178  29  496 41  747 
1949 -  200  33  400 48  681 
 
1950 -  205  40  484 59  788 
1951 1  228  50  859 63  1201 
1952 5  245  57  812 75  1194 
1953 6  293  64  862 82  1307 
1954 7  368  68  633 88  1164 
 
1955 11  368  72  986 106  1543 
1956 11  373  73  1097 123  1677 
______________________________________________________________  
Source: Adapted from Barlow, Jayasuriya, and Tan. (1994). Appendix A4 
 
 
For different applications, many different types of 
synthetic rubbers were innovated and produced 
commercially.  A major process innovation was emulsion 
copolymerization of 3 parts of butadiene with 1 part of 
styrene.  Germans called it Buna-S and the Americans 
renamed it government rubber styrene, or GR-S.  It is  
 
 
known around the world as styrene butadiene rubber or 
SBR.  
These copolymers were produced at hotter 40-60 
0C temperatures (Barlow et. al, 1994).  SBR had better 
properties than emulsion poly-butadienes.  The use of 
styrene-butadiene rubber (SBR) gives tires good wet grip, 
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and is extensively useful in treads for passenger tires.  
These synthetic rubbers were technically inferior to natural 
rubber, and were considered general-purpose rubber 
materials.   
 
Soviet National Innovation Policy  
 During the inter-war period, the largest producer 
and user of synthetic rubber was the former Soviet Union 
(Barlow et. al, 1994), under the policy of self-sufficiency 
(which continued until its breakdown in 1989).  By 1934, 
the Soviet production of the sodium polybutadiene rubbers 
reached 11,000 tonnes, and increased to 79,700 long tonnes 
by 1939 (Barlow et. al, 1994, p. 70).  Small quantities of 
other synthetic rubbers were also made.  This met roughly 
three quarters of the national rubber requirements in the 
Soviet Union. 
From 1929 to 1936, The Great Depression reduced 
the new planting and production of natural rubber around 
the world.  The government support and protection in 
Germany and former Soviet Union boosted the innovation 
and production of synthetic rubber. 
  
American National Innovation Policy 
And Synthetic Rubber Innovations 
  
At first there was limited interest in the United 
States in innovating process for making synthetic rubber for 
general-purpose applications. In 1929 there was an 
agreement between Standard Oil of New Jersey and IG 
Farben to share technological know-how about buna 
rubbers and the rubber markets (Barlow et. al, 1994; Love 
and Giffels, 1999). IG Farben persuaded the US tire makers 
to use Buna S rubber in tires, but the price was higher and 
the properties were inferior.  Buna S was hard to process, it 
had lower tack, and it was more likely to delaminate.  In the 
1930s, the US consumption of Buna S was negligible.   
 In the 1930s, Du Pont developed neoprene for 
applications requiring higher resistance to oil, flame, and 
solvents, than natural rubber.  Its production increased to 
2,500 tonnes by 1940 (Barlow et. al, 1994). 
 In 1937, as the war seemed imminent for the 
involvement of the United States, it realized that its army 
soldiers may travel short distances on their stomachs, but to 
run long distances they needed rubber.  A rising Nazi 
Germany owned and protected most of the secrets for mass-
producing synthetic rubber, Buna-S.  Their supporter in the 
East, Japan, was likely to invade the South-East Asia and 
control the supply chain from the natural rubber plantations.   
 Outbreak of the World War II in September 1939, 
and the Japanese invasion and occupation of the South-East 
Asian rubber plantations in early 1942, cut off the global 
supply-chain for natural rubber to the Western world.  
These developments forced the United States to carefully 
reconsider its strategic rubber requirements.  By 1939, 
knowledge about Buna S and Buna N was limited in the 
United States (Barlow et. al, 1994).  There were only small 
quantities of synthetic rubber produced in 1940.   
With the imminent shortage of natural rubber, all 
the major tire and rubber companies, concentrating in 
Akron, Ohio, were keen on developing synthetic rubber 
technology (Love and Giffels, 1999).  Their senior 
executives had visited Germany but the Germans knew 
their strategic advantage with synthetic rubber technology, 
and were not interested in sharing their technological lead.  
In 1937, the President and the Director of Research at 
Goodrich visited Germany but came back empty handed.  
They turned to their ace rubber chemist, Waldo Semon to 
discover the secrets of Buna-S (SBR) rubber, with potential 
use in tires.  He had researched and improved the ageing of 
rubber goods (Love and Giffels, 1999).  Semon innovated 
adhesives that bonded rubber linings to metal tanks.  This 
led to his invention of polyvinyl chloride (PVC), one of the 
most popular plastics in use in the 20th century.  
 Semon, fluent in German, French, and many other 
languages, studied the existing technical and patent 
literature on synthetic rubber.  He narrowed down on some 
German patents and recommended to the Goodrich 
management to license the production of Buna-S patents.  
Adolph Hitler refused, and he limited the use of synthetic 
rubber for Germany only.  Next, Goodrich sent Semon to 
Germany to trade PVC technology know-how for synthetic 
rubber technology know-how.  Germans extracted a lot of 
information from Semon, with different researchers 
interrogating him in shifts.  In return, Semon gathered very 
little additional information about synthetic rubber 
production process from his German counterparts (Love 
and Giffels, 1999).  On return, Semon recommended that 
Goodrich must develop the synthetic rubber technology in-
house. 
A number of scientists at Goodrich, Firestone, 
Goodyear, and other research institutions were encouraged 
by their employers to work hard to unravel the secrets of 
innovating a process for making synthetic rubber.  (Love 
and Giffels, 1999). 
The US government sponsored a big surge in the 
innovation of synthetic rubber technology.  The 
government sponsored Rubber Reserve Company 
coordinated research and production across multiple 
enterprises (Dunbrook, 1954).  Large-scale plants were 
built to manufacture GR-S.  The styrene-butadiene rubber 
(SBR), produced with a hot process, had lower viscosity 
than Buna S, and did not require pre-heat softening like 
Buna-S.  A number of GR-S rubbers were developed, but 
they had difficulty for use in tire application (Dinsmore and 
Juve, 1954).  The production of GR-S was standardized in 
most plants.  Within months, and with an accelerated 
program of development of synthetic rubber, the production 
of GR-S increased to 833,500 tonnes by 1945 – making US 
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the largest producer of synthetic rubber and natural rubber 
(See Table-1 and Table-2).  By 1945, the ratio of the use of 
natural rubber in total rubber production declined to 13 
percent (Barlow et. al, 1994). 
 By the end of World War II in 1945, as the supply-
chain for natural rubber was reestablished, the pressure to 
produce and use synthetic rubber declined.  The world 
production of synthetic rubber declined to 787,900 tonnes 
in 1950, with the US production of synthetic rubber falling 
to 483,000 tonnes (Barlow et. al, 1994).  
After the Second World-War, there was socio-
political upheaval in South-East Asia.  This depressed the 
further growth of natural rubber production there, and 
boosted the development and growth of production of 
synthetic rubber in North America, Europe, and Japan.  
Gradually, different types of synthetic rubbers were 
custom-innovated to target commercialization in specific 
market segments.  World production of synthetic rubber 
overtook the world production of natural rubber in the 
1960s. 
 In Canada, the government had helped a number 
of American companies produce 46,000 tonnes by 1945.  
The production of SR declined a little after the war, with 
significant export to the United States and Europe.   
The occupied allied powers dismantled the 
synthetic rubber plants in Germany, and their synthetic 
rubber production disappeared.  The production of synthetic 
rubber in the former USSR and East Germany increased to 
205,000 tonnes and 39,800 tonnes respectively (Barlow et. 
al, 1994).   
The political situation in South-East Asia 
stabilized gradually in the 1960s, and the production of 
natural rubber started growing again.  In the 1970s, as the 
price of gasoline increased, the cost of producing synthetic 
rubbers increased.  The innovation of radial tires, using 
more natural rubber, boosted its demand at the expense of 
use of styrene butadiene rubber (SBR) (Barlow et. al, 
1994).  During the 1980s, the increase in wages and cost of 
planting natural rubber increased the price of natural 
rubber.  In the early 1990s, lower prices reduced the 
production of natural rubbers as well as most of the 
synthetic rubbers.  The worldwide production of all types of 
rubbers matured and became static.  By then, the American 
National Innovation Policy for synthetic rubber had firmly 
established this key industry in the U. S. economy. 
 
2. REGIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY 
  
The innovations and growth of the rubber industry 
has been closely connected with the role the University of 
Akron has played since its inception in 1871, around the 
time when rubber industry started in Akron, Ohio.  On the 
U.S. Independence Day, July 4, 1871, about 45 years after 
the City of Akron was established in 1825, a cornerstone 
was laid by the liberal Universalists to start a new Buchtel 
College to mark the centenary of the progressive 
Universalism in America (Knepper, 1990).   
Until 1907, Buchtel College remained a private, 
church-related liberal arts college.  It severed its close 
affiliation with the Ohio Universalist Convention, and 
remained a private college for six years before becoming 
the Municipal University of Akron in 1913.  In the early 
1960s, this was recognized as one of the nation’s best 
municipal universities.  In 1963, it became an Ohio state-
assisted municipal university, converting into a full-fledged 
state university of Ohio in 1967.   
From early years, the University of Akron played a 
key catalytic role in the growth of rubber industry.  In 
1908, Charles M. Knight, professor of chemistry at Buchtel 
College, predecessor of the University of Akron, not only 
taught chemistry but heavily consulted with the emerging 
rubber industry (Love and Giffels, 1999).  Knight 
motivated his students to get out of their university research 
laboratory and apply their knowledge to the emerging 
challenges in the rubber industry.  Knight helped raise 
money for a building to house his rubber chemistry 
laboratory.  The building was built in 1909, and Knight 
taught there the world’s first course in rubber science on 
September 13, 1910.  In 1913, Knight retired as Buchtel 
professor of chemistry and installed one of his early 
students, Hezzleton E. Simmons, as his successor.   
Simmons taught rubber chemistry, and continued 
to put emphasis on rubber chemistry when he took over as 
the President in 1951.  He hired G. Stafford Whitby during 
the World War II to focus on synthetic rubber research.  
The research studies at the University of Akron 
complemented the research done by the Akron’s four major 
tire companies, Firestone, General, Goodrich, and 
Goodyear.  The U.S. government funded research helped 
establish new laboratories to do research on synthetic 
rubber.  The University of Akron was one of the major 
centers to do research on synthetic rubber that helped the 
Allied forces in World War II to keep rapidly rolling 
towards victory. 
The Rubber Society of the American Chemical 
Society awarded Whitby its highest Charles Goodyear 
Award.  For his contributions to rubber industry, he was 
inducted into the International Rubber Science Hall of 
Fame.  In 1948, Whitby persuaded Maurice Morton from 
McGill University in Montreal, Canada, to take over as the 
assistant director of the Rubber Research Laboratory at the 
University of Akron.  Morton wrote and received a lot of 
grants from military to fund his research.  This helped him 
establish a world-class technological center, and helped 
Akron emerge and sustain as the Rubber Capital of the 
World.   
Then, in 1952, Morton set his goal to start an 
unprecedented Ph.D. degree granting research program in 
rubber polymers.  To continue his world-class research in 
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rubbers, he needed a regular stream of graduate students 
and research associates.  He reasoned that the growing 
professionalism in the rubber industry would provide the 
demand for the polymer graduates. Morton approached 
President Norman Auburn persuasively, and was persistent 
till he got what he wanted. The University of Akron started 
its first Ph.D. program based on its most sophisticated 
research program in rubber, and admitted the first five 
students in 1956 to do their studies in polymer science.    
In 1978, Dr. Frank Kelley, an alumni of the 
University of Akron, with many family members working 
at Goodyear, left a highly successful career in the Air Force 
to take over as the director of the Institute of Polymer 
Science.  He became the dean of the world’s first College 
of Polymer Science and Polymer Engineering created in 
1988.  It consolidated rubber and polymer related activities 
carried out in many different academic units of the 
University of Akron (Knepper, 1990).  Kelley managed to 
increase the external grant funding for research from US$ 
400,000 to US$ 9 million a year in 1996 (Love and Giffels, 
1999).     
President William V. Muse joined the University 
of Akron in 1984.  Akron seemed depressed after tire plant 
closings and layoffs of rubber jobs.  Muse noticed that 
“rubber and polymer science” was a niche area of 
excellence where the University could shine nationally and 
internationally.  He decided that Akron needed to raise 
from ground a towering symbolic phoenix in the form of a 
shining building dedicated to do research in rubber and 
polymer Science.  The US$ 17 million, 146,000 square-feet 
Goodyear Polymer Science Building was completed in 
1991.  It brought back the lost glory of the Rubber Capital 
years (The University of Akron archives).  The 12-story 
twin-tower has an unusual structure and a reflecting façade, 
making it one of the most recognizable landmarks of the 
Rubber Capital region in the Northeast Ohio.   
The College of Polymer Science and Polymer 
Engineering has grown into the largest and most 
comprehensive program in the United States, feeding most 
number of professionally qualified researchers into the 
world rubber industry.  According to the last survey done in 
1997 by the U.S. News and World Report, Akron’s polymer 
program was ranked close second to the University of 
Massachusetts’s program at Amherst.  Akron was well 
ahead of some of the highly endowed private universities.   
A lot of emerging polymer science is rooted in the 
principles of rubber science predecessor.  Goodrich and 
GenCorp, the successor of General Tires are not active in 
rubber, but very deeply involved in polymers.  Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Company chairman Samir Gibara, pointed 
out that the Akron region draws more competitive 
advantage with the Polymer Science and Engineering 
Institute at the University of Akron than it would by having 
another two tire plants.  He shared that, “It (the Polymer 
program) provides the intellectual legacy of the tire 
industry to the city” (Love and Giffels, 1999).   Goodyear 
and Bridgestone/Firestone have maintained their research 
and technology development centers in Akron, because the 
University of Akron provides their researchers “a window 
to the world of polymers.”   
Since its start, the University of Akron has 
produced hundreds of Master’s and Doctorate graduates in 
rubber science for the rubber industries everywhere around 
the world.  A number of these highly skilled scientists have 
joined, and they often run a wide variety of value-adding 
rubber polymer companies in and around Akron.  Akron 
University graduates lead Advanced Elastomer Systems, 
GenCorp, A. Schulman, Americhem, and many more 
leading rubber companies.  Many of the international 
students graduating from the Polymer Science and Polymer 
Engineering program of the University of Akron have gone 
back to develop and grow rubber- and polymer-based 
companies in their home countries.   
In 1997, this author in collaboration with a 
partnership with Dean Kelley of the College of Polymer 
Science and Polymer Engineering, innovated award-
winning inter-disciplinary programs in Technology 
Management and Innovation.  In a jointly taught course 
named Polymer Management Decisions, Dean Kelley and 
this author developed seamless cases and course materials 
for the Master’s and Ph.D. students in Polymer Science and 
Polymer Engineering.  Many of these students, who 
completed a Graduate Certificate in Technology 
Management and Innovation, significantly enhanced their 
marketability and earning potential in polymer and rubber 
industries. 
 The University of Akron also supports a number 
of area high schools with their focus on polymers.  In 1994, 
an associate degree program in polymer testing and 
processing was started to supply highly skilled workforce 
for the rubber and polymer industries.  The University also 
created in 1994 the Akron Polymer Training Center, 
offering testing and training in rubber processing to the 
people already working in the rubber and polymer 
industries.   
In the Northeast Ohio, within 60 miles from 
Akron, there are more than 400 polymer and rubber-related 
companies drawing technological guidance from the 
University of Akron.  This is one of the world’s highest 
concentrations of polymer and rubber companies in a 
region.  Some people have renamed the region from the 
Rubber Capital of the World to the Polymer Valley. 
 
3. RISK-TAKING INNOVATIVE ENTERPRISES  
 
Synthetic rubber is produced in the United States 
by 25 large capital intensive vertically-integrated plants, 
though synthetic rubber is sometimes one of the many bulk 
chemicals produced in these petrochemical complexes.  
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Many of these are petrochemical complexes with synthetic 
rubber production as the forward vertical integration.  Some 
major tire manufacturers, produce synthetic rubber for their 
backward vertical integration.  The styrene-butadiene 
synthetic rubber (SBR) plant of Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company in Houston, Texas, with 500 workers produced as 
much rubber as 180,000 rubber plantation farmers in South 
India (Barlow et al., 1994).   
Like plastics, synthetic rubber comes in a variety 
of chemical compositions with different levels of 
performance characteristics.  Emulsion styrene-butadiene 
rubber (E-SBR), butadiene rubber (BR), and cis-
polyisoprene rubber (IR) are used in large tonnage 
quantities (million tons) and are sometimes referred as 
commodity elastomers.  The medium-tonnage SRs 
including ethylene-propylene (EPDM), solution styrene-
butadiene (S-SBR), butyl rubber (IIR), nitrile (NBR) and 
chloroprene (CR) are produced in 0.5 to 1 million tonne 
range.  Highly specialized elastomers such as thermoplastic 
elastomers (TPE) and others are produced in smaller 
quantities. 
Most of the consumption of rubber is in the 
industrial North America, Western Europe, and the north-
east Asia – far away from the tropical regions where natural 
rubber is grown.  The synthetic rubber plants are located 
near the heavy consumers of rubber. 
 
EMERGENCE OF A REGIONAL INNOVATION 
CLUSTER FOR RUBBER TECHNOLOGY BARONS 
 
 Akron, Ohio, at the junction of 41.04 N and 
81.31W, was born in 1825 when the Ohio and Erie Canal 
was being planned from Erie Lake moving down south.  
About 500 miles away from Akron, an ex Civil war 
surgeon, Dr. Benjamin Franklin Goodrich (1841-1888), 
switched from practicing medicine to oil-drilling, and then 
to rubber processing (Love and Giffels, 1999).  With a 
partner he started Hudson Rubber Company in Melrose, 
New York near Albany.  The company needed more 
investment but the partner refused to contribute more 
capital unless they moved to the west of the Allegheny 
mountains running through Pennsylvania, with no 
competition for rubber goods.  Goodrich visited Cleveland 
in search of new investments, but most investors in 
Cleveland were interested in investing in shining steel mills 
or drilling “Black Gold” oil in the neighboring 
Pennsylvania (Love and Giffels, 1999). 
 On his visit, Goodrich saw a one-page flyer of the 
Akron Board of Trade’s 1870 report.  He presented his 
business plan to the Board of Trade members who invested 
in his rubber venture, which led to the birth of rubber and 
tire industry in Akron, Ohio (Love and Giffels, 1999). (This 
will be elaborated in greater detail in the next section). 
In 1898, Frank A. Seiberling followed the 
footsteps of Dr. Benjamin Franklin, and founded the 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company to honor Charles 
Goodyear who died penniless in 1860 stabilizing rubber.  
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company started selling rubber 
sundries on December 1, 1898 (Rodengen, 1997).  At first it 
primarily focused on high-volume pneumatic bicycle tires 
and solid carriage tires.  Bicycle tire business was highly 
fragmented with six companies, including Dunlop, Hartford 
Rubber of Connecticut, and others from Chicago 
(Rodengen, 1997).   
In 1900, Paul W. Litchfield, Goodyear’s first 
technically trained tire executive took over as factory 
superintendent at the young age of 25.  As a senior at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Litchfield got 
involved into emerging rubber technology innovations and 
visited a number of rubber factories in New England 
(O’Reilly 1983).  After graduation, he first joined one 
bicycle tire maker, and then moved to a belting company in 
New England.  He then moved to International Automobile 
and Vehicle Tire Company where he designed automotive 
tires, before moving to Goodyear in Akron.  Under his 
guidance as a tire designer, rubber compounder, and a 
factory supervisor managing personnel, Goodyear 
Company innovated its first automobile tire in 1901.  By 
then, Goodyear was producing 400,000 bicycle tires per 
year.  Litchfield steadily built Goodyear as a global rubber 
giant enterprise.   
On August 3, 1900, Harvey S. Firestone 
contributed $10,000, half of the total investment used to 
charter the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company of Akron, 
Ohio, under the laws of West Virginia (Lief, 1951).  At that 
time, Ohio’s laws imposed double liability on stockholders.  
Harvey Firestone had moved to Akron to work for 
Whitman & Barnes, a manufacturer of carriage tires, rubber 
horseshoe pads, and twist drills.  Harvey contributed his 
patent for applying tires to carriage wheel channels, and his 
associates assigned their side wire patent to the new 
corporation.  The early challenge for the tire industry was 
how to keep the tires from slipping off the wheel. 
The popularity of bicycles with salesmen, 
engineers, and doctors and other in the 1890s had boosted 
the demand and production of tires.  Next came the surge in 
demand for solid rubber tires for smoother ride on 
carriages.  In Akron, entrepreneurs engaged in farm 
equipment, building construction, railways and other 
businesses, rapidly switched to rubber. 
In January 1901, Texas Oil Industry was 
discovered with a big oil find.  Then came the amazing rise 
of the automobile industry in Detroit.  In 1907, Goodyear 
and other rubber companies established their offices in 
Detroit. 
Cooper Tire Company also started in Akron in 
1914 as a maker of tire repair kits (Love and Giffels, 1999).  
In 1915, it acquired Akron Giant Tire and Rubber 
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Company.  In 1917, Cooper moved to Findlay, Ohio, about 
120 miles west of Akron.   
 
4. CATALYTIC REGIONAL INNOVATION 
INSTITUTION 
 
  The Akron Board of Trade, through its 1870 flyer 
attracted potential innovative entrepreneurs to Akron’s low 
18.7 mil tax rate, rich coal mines, and flour mills (Love and 
Giffels, 1999).  The Akron Board was willing to nurture 
innovative new enterprises. 
Dr. Benjamin Goodrich visited Akron and saw 
large quantities of coal being dug and transported by new 
railway lines transporting cereal oat products, sewer pipes, 
and farm machines.  The fast-growing city was the home of 
leading enterprises like American Tin Plate, American 
Sewer Plate, Diamond Match, International Harvester, 
Quaker Oats, and others.  Ten new churches were springing 
up near the downtown (Love and Giffels, 1999).  Paved 
South Howard Street had fashionable shops, and Victorian 
mansions spread along the East Market and Fir-Hill area. 
Dr. Goodrich was impressed.  He met and 
explained his business plan for a rubber factory to the 
Akron Board of Trade.  He was going to invest US$ 
20,000, and he wanted the Board members to invest US$ 
15,000 in his rubber factory which threatened none of their 
existing businesses.  A number of board members, 
including president John F. Seiberling, a farm equipment 
manufacturer and the father of Goodyear founder, with the 
grandson of Akron founder Simon Perkins, each invested 
US$ 1,000 or less, for a total of US$13,600 (equivalent to 
over US$ 400,000 in 2007 dollars).  Goodrich raised the 
other $20,000 and had enough financial capital to re-
establish his rubber factory in Akron, Ohio.  
Goodrich and his brother-in-law Harvey W. Tew 
of Jamestown, New York, opened Goodrich, Tew & Co. on 
Main Street Akron, south of Exchange and near Lock One 
of the Ohio Canal.  The company’s major product was fire 
hose, but it also produced other rubber goods such as belts, 
bottle stoppers, rings for fruit jars, valves, tips for billiard 
cues and more. 
The first five years were financially rough for 
Goodrich.  The investors wanted their money out.  Dr. 
Goodrich bought them out for US$ 12,500 with help from 
Colonel Perkins.  The company’s stock at US$ 50,000 was 
raised in 1880 to US$ 100,000 and the company was 
incorporated as BF Goodrich.  The company’s financial 
performance improved with the bicycle boom of the 1880s, 
continuing until the late 1890s.   
In the 1880s, John Boyd Dunlap of Belfast, Ireland 
obtained in England fairly broad bicycle tire patents.  He 
then also captured other key patents for fastening the 
pneumatic tires to a flat-base flange.  This helped Dunlap 
gain a substantial market share in the global pneumatic tire 
industry.  BF Goodrich produced the first pneumatic tires in 
the United States in 1896 for the Cleveland-based Winton 
automobile (O’Reilley, 1983).  
The Panic of 1893 and the subsequent economic 
depression shrank 2,000 jobs in Akron with 40,000 
residents, and made it easier for companies to hire skilled 
unemployed.  America’s first gasoline-powered Duryea 
automobile was introduced in 1892.  Soon thereafter a 
number of automobiles, including Autocar, Ford, Stanley-
Steamer, Hertel, Haynes-Apperson, Oldsmobile, and others 
were introduced (O’Reilley, 1983).  Michelin of France was 
the first to install pneumatic tires on automobiles.  By 1908, 
the horse-drawn carriages were being replaced by 65,000 
automobiles produced in the U.S.   
With 40 of the 134 U.S. tire companies located in 
Akron by 1920, Akron became well known around the 
world as the Rubber Capital of the World (O’Reilly, 1983).  
There was a rubber company on every other city block.  
Between 1910 and 1920, Akron was one of the fastest 
growing cities in the United States.  During this period, its 
population tripled from 69,087 to 208,435 with the rapid 
expansion of rubber-related enterprises.  Here the rubber 
barons blended their entrepreneurial ambitions with 
emerging technological innovations and their capital to 
multiply their wealth to dizzying levels.   
Workers from nearby steel mills and coal mines of 
West Virgina and Pennsylvania, and the poor hopefuls from 
the Southern states of Kentucky and Tennessee, migrated in 
large numbers to Akron looking for the well-paying rubber 
jobs.  So did hundreds of workers from distant Hungary, 
Russia, Italy, and Austria rushing in seeking “the Black 
Rubber Gold.”  Housing shortage was so severe in this 
boomtown that workers rented beds by 8-hour shifts.  Some 
workers’ families were willing to live in chicken coops. By 
1930, more than 40 percent of the tires made in the United 
States were made in Akron’s rubber enterprises (O’Reilly, 
1983).  The Great Depression in the 1930s slashed the 
demand for automobiles and rubber tires and Akron’s 
population declined by 4 percent. 
As mentioned before, the rubber enterprises in 
Akron, however, rebounded during the World War II.  
Rubber industry became part of America’s winning giant 
industrial-military complex.   The Goodyear Aircraft 
Company employed 32,000 workers at its peak.  After the 
end of war, the rubber industry in Akron shrank a little.  
But, it had a healthy growth for the next 20 years – until the 
twin shocks from the disruptive radial tire innovation and 
the sky-rocketing oil-prices. 
 
5. DISRUPTING RIVAL RADIAL TIRE 
INNOVATORS 
 
A national innovation policy may encourage an 
enterprise to become more innovative, but the enterprise 
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must still compete in the dynamic marketplace with its 
rivals.  Alternate technological innovations continually 
compete to emerge as the dominant design and the 
preferred technology standard in an industry (Gehani, 
1998).  Utterback and Abernathy (1975) examined the 
dynamic pattern of product and process innovations, and 
defined dominant design as the product innovation when a 
number of product innovations converge to a commonly 
accepted product design.   
Foster (1986) suggested that often incumbent 
technological leaders get complacent, and new-generation 
innovators gain “attacker’s advantage.”  Bower and 
Christensen (1995) noted that as markets shift, the industry 
leaders with large investments sunk in their existing 
technologies (who were once disruptive innovators 
themselves); fail to see the emerging disruptive innovations 
coming from the potential or new challengers.  The 
incumbents resist making large investments in new 
technological innovations to reach out to the emerging new 
customers.  Bower and Christensen (1995) postulated that 
the new disruptive technologies demand a portfolio of 
competencies that are different from those of the incumbent 
technological innovations and the existing customers 
(Gehani, 1998).   
Christensen (1997) also pointed out that prudent 
business strategies, such as investing in the most profitable 
products currently in high demand by the best customers, 
can weaken an industry leader.  Based on his studies of a 
number of industries, Christensen noted that breakthrough 
technologies and disruptive innovations may be overlooked 
because many existing customers may be lukewarm at first 
to such radical discontinuous innovations.  Customer driven 
incumbents may choose to overlook such strategically 
significant innovations.  This allows more nimble 
entrepreneurial innovators “to catch the next great wave of 
industry growth” (Christensen, 1997). This phenomenon is 
vividly illustrated by the evolution of rubber and tire 
industry.   
In 1946, Pierre Boudon, related to the Michelin 
founding family, was granted a patent for a new radial type 
of tire construction (Love and Giffels, 1999).  The 
reinforcement in radial tires is aligned along the tire cross-
section instead of being in biased cross plies as in the 
conventional tires.  The radial tires had approximately 7% 
higher fuel economy and almost twice the durability of a 
bias-ply tire.  But these tires had a less smooth and harder 
ride (Rodengen, 1997).  The radial tires also had the 
propensity to delaminate.  They required new tire-building 
equipment, and they were lot more costly to produce.  
Radial tires sold for 65% more than the bias-ply tires.       
In the mid-sixties, Michelin received a large order 
to sell radial tires in the U.S. through Sears and Roebuck, 
and the fear of radial tire innovation spread through the 
U.S. automotive and tire industries.  The radial tires 
required expensive retooling for the auto industry as well as 
the tire industry.  Some of the senior tire executives, who 
held previous assignments in Europe, feared that sooner or 
later the radial tires would be adopted by a large number of 
American consumers.   
In 1970 and 1971, only 1% of replacement tires 
were radial tires (Rodengen, 1997).  As the gas prices 
soared higher and higher in the 1970s, increasing number of 
consumers adopted the radial tire innovation for its higher 
fuel efficiency and durability.  Diffusion of adoption of 
radials for replacement tires increased rapidly to more than 
14% in 1973, and almost to 25% by 1975. 
Michelin management was fully committed to 
spread the radial revolution.  Between 1971 and 1975, it 
invested over US$1 billion globally to convert and 
modernize a majority of their 45 plants around the world, 
and emerged as the third-largest tire maker in the world and 
the largest tire-maker in Europe, edging past Dunlap 
(Rodengen, 1997).  Ford started fitting radial tires on its 
Continental cars, and new models (Rodengen, 1997; 
Financial World, 1974).  In 1975, Michelin opened its first 
North American tire making plant in South Carolina, 
making 80 million radial tires a year. 
Goodyear, Firestone, Goodrich, Uniroyal, General 
and others first resisted the disruptive innovation of radial 
tire technology innovated by Michelin.  But, Goodrich first 
saw the significance of the radial tire innovation, and 
stopped making passenger tires in Akron in 1975.  In 1978, 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company shut down its rubber 
tire factory in Akron.  Firestone rushed to launch its 500 
Radial tire truck in the market.  But the tread peeled off, 
and Firestone was forced to have one of the U.S. rubber 
industry’s largest tire recalls (Love and Giffels, 1999).  
Firestone shutdown its rubber tire plants in Akron in 1981.  
Between 1975 and early 1982, more than 6,100 rubber tire 
jobs were lost.  The rubber workers had played a key 
collaborative role in the rise of the rubber industry in the 
Rubber Capital Akron.  They were also going to play an 
equally significant role in its demise in Akron by deepening 
the cracks caused by Michelin’s radial revolution. 
 
6. COLLABORATIVE INNOVATIVE SUPPLIERS 
 
Finally, under a National Innovation System, 
enterprises do not operate or compete in isolation by 
themselves.  They compete based on the help and support 
they receive from their collaborative suppliers.  They 
innovate by partnering with their collaborative suppliers.  
Suppliers who collaborate and help their buyers innovate 
provide a strategic source of competitive advantage.  Wal-
Mart and Microsoft dominate their respective industrial 
sectors, not only because of the innovations of their 
founders, their competitive strategies, but also because of 
the powerful supplier ecosystems they have developed 
(Lansiti and Levien.  2004).  Their supplier ecosystems 
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include their worldwide suppliers, outsourcing partners, 
distributors, and producers of supporting technologies.  
Together these network relationships boost the health and 
vigor of their ecosystems by creating and sharing platforms 
of products, services, tools, and technological innovations 
to gain their competitive advantages.   
For the rubber tire manufacturers, the labor-
intensive tire building is a key capability that drives their 
competitive advantage.  Supply of skilled, affordable, and 
willing rubber workers can make or break an innovative 
rubber and tire enterprise.  Workers’ unions govern the 
supply of a steady stream of able and willing workers 
needed to run tire building equipment.  Akron emerged as a 
regional cluster and the Rubber Capital of the World in 
1920 because of the steady stream of skilled immigrants 
and migrant workers from the neighboring West Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, Kentucky and Tennessee.  Deteriorating 
relationship of management with United Rubber workers’ 
union also led to the downfall of the Rubber Capital in the 
1960s.  
The robust growth of the rubber factories in the 
1920s was firmly founded on the backs of poor 
Appalachian whites from the East, and the poor African-
Americans from down South.  As the rubber industry grew, 
more African-Americans migrated from the South.  In 
1910, there were only 657 African-Americans living in 
Akron.  Their number increased to 5,580 in 1920, and it 
exceeded more than 10,000 by 1930 (Dyer, 2003).  The 
World War II expanded the need for workers in rubber and 
allied industries, and in the 1940s more than 12,000 
African-Americans migrated to the Rubber Capital in 
Akron.  Let us examine how the role of rubber workers’ 
union pulled the final curtain down for the rubber industry 
in the Rubber Capital of the World. 
In April 1979, M. G. “Jerry” O’Neil, the Chairman 
of General Tire, was heading the only rubber company in 
the region still running a full-scale truck-tire building with 
1,265 workers (Dyer, 2003).  It’s Plant I was a relic built in 
1915 with a multi-story design and wooden floors.  The 
more modern tire plants used a single-storey design with a 
more efficient production flow.  O’Neill addressed workers 
and requested them for a pay cut to pay for building a more 
modern single-story tire building plant.   
Akron, with a strong rubber workers’ union had 
negotiated higher wages, and therefore a higher cost of 
doing business compared to the Southern parts of the 
United States with unorganized labor and lower wages.  
Larger land needed for a single-story tire plant was cheaper 
in the South.   
The Local 9 Union bent its rules and agreed to 
take a 36 cents an hour pay cut – to pay for building the 
new single-story plant (Love and Giffels, 1999).  The new 
plant was proposed to be built near Akron Municipal 
Airport, or in the nearby Northfield.  The money was 
promised to be returned to workers if the plans to build the 
new plant were to be canceled.  The rubber workers agreed 
to work on Sundays and that they would run the proposed 
plant unprecedented 7 days a week.  Managers were 
granted the discretion to assign workers their jobs 
irrespective of their seniority.  The rubber workers agreed 
to compromise because they recognized and accepted the 
new threat of global radial tire competition in rubber 
industry. 
 O’Neil carefully considered the union workers’ 
concessions, but re-examined the bottom line, and proposed 
to shut down Plant-1 in Akron in February 1982  (Dyer, 
2003).  Investment in the new single-story plant in and 
around Akron did not seem financially attractive enough for 
the General Tire management.   
Five years later, in 1987, General’s Tire plants 
were sold to German Continental AG.  Other parts were 
retained as Gen Corp.  O’Neil retired as the chief executive 
of Gen Corp in 1993 (Dyer, 2003).    
Between 1960 and 1979, at least 24 of the 31 tire 
plants built in the United States were built in the South with 
no organized unions.  The union of rubber workers could 
not demand increase in salaries in the South to match the 
inflation in cost of living.  Most of the rubber plants in 
Akron were not modernized or re-equipped with the radial 
tire technology innovation (Dyer, 2003). 
Prior to these plant closings, Akron already had a 
high 15% unemployment.  Tire building workers, who were 
used to earning a high $13/hour wage, were willing to take 
any work at a fraction of their former wages after these 
plant closings.  When a nearby Land ‘O Lakes dairy factory 
announced the opening of 74 minimum wage jobs, more 
than 7,000 applications flooded in (Love and Giffels, 1999).   
By 1983, Akron was left with very few tire 
building rubber jobs.  Rubber plants and head-offices were 
shut down and moved to the South.  Ironically, the South 
was the place from where legions of workers had earlier 
migrated to make Akron the Rubber Capital of the world.  
Between 1970 and 1990, more than 50,000 people, and 
about a fifth of Akron’s population went away.  Housing 
units in Akron declined in the 1980s (Dyer, 2003). 
 To survive the downfall, Goodrich and Uniroyal 
first merged their tire operations in 1986.  But, their 
corporate cultures were too rigid to blend.  Three years 
later, the combined company was sold to Michelin Tire 
company of France.  In 1994, Michelin moved its tire 
production facilities in Akron to Greenville, South Carolina 
(Dyer, 2003).   
 Goodrich, turned into primarily a chemical and 
aerospace company, and moved out of Akron to Bath 
township in 1986.  It then shifted to Richfield in 1996.  
Goodrich’s former multi-storey tire plant on Main Street in 
Akron was remodeled to house Akron Global Accelerator 
with multiple start-up companies.  Its former factories were 
transformed into offices occupied by Advanced Elastomer 
Systems, a joint-venture between Exxon and Monsanto, 
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developing thermoplastic elastomers (TPEs) – the next-
generation of specialty synthetic rubbers (Dyer, 2003). 
 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
 
 This empirical study of innovations in rubber and 
tire technology has illustrated that a tri-helical National 
Innovation System can kick start innovations in an 
emerging risky technology.  The synergistic interactions 
between government, university, and industry can also give 
birth to innovative new high-growth regions.  However, as 
illustrated by the evolution and innovations in rubber 
industry, in the long run the innovative enterprises must 
withstand the dynamic external challenges posed by their 
disruptive rival innovators and other geo-political 
environmental forces.  In such difficult times, the support of 
collaborative innovative suppliers of key resources, either 
raw materials or human capital, must not be 
underestimated.   
Our future studies would focus on the financial 
analyses of leading innovators in a National Innovation 
System.  These new investigations would help us validate 
the reasons for, and results from, the key strategic decisions 
regarding relocating production plants away from a regional 
innovation cluster while incurring enormous financial and 
human expenses. 
In the case of rubber and tire technology, the 
innovative enterprises such as Goodrich, Firestone, General 
Tires, and Goodyear, bore the full impact of the tsunamis 
from their key stakeholders, while their national 
government stood on the sidelines.  In the free-market 
capitalist economy, the national U.S. government did little 
as tens of thousands of rubber workers were laid off with 
grave consequences for their family members and their 
communities.  In emerging economies like Brazil, India, or 
Thailand, can their national governments afford to standby 
as their large enterprises are forced to adapt to the tectonic 
shifts in their global market forces? 
 It is, therefore, proposed that corporate strategic 
leaders and national policy makers carefully assess and 
integrate the impact of disruptive innovations by the key 
rivals and consider the full potential contributions from 
their collaborative suppliers.  These must be integrated in 
an inter-dependent manner with the national innovation 
policy, regional innovation accelerator institutions, and the 
key regional universities and institutions of higher 
education most relevant to the firms’ technologies. 
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